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Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019) 
 
Dylan M. Jaicks 
 
  Stemming from the conviction of a Crow tribal member for illegal 
hunting, Herrera v. Wyoming reignited long-running questions concerning 
treaty abrogation and precedent. In an effort to clarify conflicting case law, 
the Supreme Court upheld the Crow Tribe’s reserved hunting rights and 
rejected the argument that statehood extinguished such rights. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Herrera v. Wyoming, the petitioner, Clayvin Herrera 
(“Herrera”), raised the question of whether the Crow Tribe’s (“Tribe”) 
rights under the 1868 Treaty (“Treaty”) were abrogated by Wyoming’s 
admission to the Union, the creation of the Bighorn National Forest, or the 
operations within the forest, and whether the doctrine of issue preclusion 
barred Herrera from using this argument as a defense to his criminal 
conviction.1 The Supreme Court of the United States determined there was 
no abrogation of the Treaty from Wyoming’s statehood, but it did not 
determine whether the location where Herrera took elk in the Bighorn 
National Forest was “occupied” within the meaning of the Treaty.2 The 
Court remanded the case for factual determinations regarding the possible 
occupation of the forest, thus leaving open the possibility of affirming 
Herrera’s conviction.3  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In 1868, the Tribe entered into the Treaty with the United States, 
ceding 30 million acres of its lands in Montana and Wyoming, while 
reserving “‘the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States 
so long as game may be found thereon, and as long as peace subsists 
among the whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts.’”4 
This provision demonstrated the importance of the Tribe’s hunting 
traditions to its culture.5  
 Months after the Treaty’s signing, the United States established 
Wyoming as a territory with the stipulation that there would be no 
“‘impair[ment of] the rights of person or property now pertaining to the 
Indians in said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain 
 
1.  Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2019). 
2. Id. at 1700–03.  
3.  Id. at 1694, 1703. 
4. Id. at 1691–93 (quoting Treaty Between the United States of 
American and the Crow Tribe of Indians art. IV, Crow-U.S., May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 
650 [hereinafter 1868 Treaty]). 
5.  Id. at 1692. 
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unextinguished by treaty.’”6 Congress then admitted Wyoming to the 
Union in 1890 on equal footing to other states.7 The congressional act 
granting Wyoming statehood did not mention the Tribe’s reserved treaty 
rights.8 Subsequently, in 1897, President Grover Cleveland established the 
Bighorn National Forest within the Tribe’s historic territories as land 
“reserved from entry or settlement.”9 
 In 2014, Herrera, a member of the Tribe, shot several bull elk 
inside the Bighorn National Forest and took the meat back to his residence 
in Montana.10 Following an investigation, Wyoming charged Herrera for 
illegally taking elk and accessory to the same.11 Herrera moved to dismiss 
the charges based on his hunting rights under the Treaty; however, the state 
trial court rejected the motion, and Herrera’s attempts to stay the trial 
court’s order were unsuccessful.12 A jury convicted Herrera on both 
counts; he received a suspended jail sentence, a fine, and a 3-year 
suspension of hunting privileges.13 On appeal, the state appellate court 
affirmed the conviction, relying on Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, which 
held that the rights under the Treaty expired upon Wyoming’s statehood.14 
The state appellate court rejected Herrera’s argument that the reserved off-
reservation hunting rights under the Treaty were still valid based on 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and its repudiation of 
Ward v. Race Horse, the case that Repsis drew its reasoning from.15 
Additionally, the appellate court held that Repsis precluded Herrera’s 
treaty defense because the validity of the Treaty had already been litigated 
on behalf of the Tribe and its members, and that the Bighorn National 
Forest was categorically “occupied” upon its creation.16 Herrera petitioned 







6.  Id. at 1693 (quoting An Act to Provide a Temporary Government 
for the Territory of Wyoming (Wyoming Territory Act), July 25, 1868, ch. 235, 15 
Stat. 178). 
7.  Id. at 1693 (quoting An Act to Provide for the Admission of the 
State of Wyoming into the Union (Wyoming Statehood Act), July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 
26 Stat. 222). 
8.  Id.  
9.  Id. (quoting Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (1897)). 
10.  Id.  
11.  Id. 
 12.      Id. 
13.  Id.  
14.  Id. (citing Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 992–93 
(10th Cir. 1995)). 
15.  Id. (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 
U.S. 172 (1999); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)). 
16.  Id. at 1694. 
 17.      Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018).  
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The Court analyzed two core issues on review: (1) the effect of 
Wyoming’s statehood on the Tribe’s hunting rights under the Treaty, and 
(2) whether the Bighorn National Forest had become “occupied” within 
the meaning of the Treaty.18 
 
A.  Validity of Reserved Treaty Rights Following Statehood 
 
 The Court first assessed whether its decision in Race Horse 
rendered the hunting rights under the Treaty invalid.19 It agreed with 
Herrera, clarifying that “Race Horse is repudiated to the extent it held that 
treaty rights can be impliedly extinguished at statehood.”20  
 In Race Horse, which Wyoming argued should control, the Court 
considered reserved hunting rights under a treaty with the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribe, which was signed the same year and contained nearly 
identical language as the 1868 Treaty.21 The Court held that Wyoming’s 
statehood extinguished the Treaty based on: (1) the equal footing doctrine, 
vesting the States with the power to regulate hunting which would have 
conflicted with the treaty rights; and (2) the lack of intent in the treaty for 
the “right to continue in ‘perpetuity,’” instead noting the “‘temporary and 
precarious’” nature of those rights.22  
 Upon review, however, the Court turned to the rationale of Mille 
Lacs instead. Although the treaty in Mille Lacs was not identical to the 
1868 Treaty, the case concerned a similar question of whether the 
Chippewa’s treaty rights continued after Minnesota became a state. The 
Mille Lacs Court explained that the equal footing doctrine would not 
necessarily conflict with reserved treaty rights where “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory regulations” could be imposed by states on Indian 
tribes to ensure conservation, and thus that “‘there is nothing inherent in 
the nature of reserved treaty rights to suggest that they can be extinguished 
by implication at statehood.’”23 Instead, Mille Lacs clarified that 
abrogation of treaty rights may only be found where Congress has clearly 
expressed its intent to do so, and Minnesota’s statehood act contained no 
such language.24 Further, the opinion stated that the reserved hunting rights 
in the treaty were not “temporary and precarious” because this language 
 
 18.      Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694, 1700–01. 
19. Id. 
20.  Id. at 1697. 
21.  Id. (citing Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Eastern Band of Shoshonees [sic] and the Bannack [sic] Tribe of Indians, 
Shoshone-Bannock-U.S., July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 674-75). 
22.  Id. at 1694 (citing Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514–15). 
23.  Id. at 1695 (emphasis in original) (citing Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 
204, 207). 
24.  Id. 
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was too broad and there was no “termination point identified in the treaty 
itself [that had] been satisfied.”25 
 In Herrera, the Court concluded that the logic underlying Mille 
Lacs had repudiated the rationales employed in Race Horse.26 This was 
true even in spite of the fact that the treaty in Race Horse provided for a 
temporal end to its treaty rights unlike the treaty in Mille Lacs.27 The Court 
made clear, however, that “the treaty termination analysis turns on the 
events enumerated in the ‘Treaty itself.’”28 
 Having distinguished Race Horse from Mille Lacs, the Court then 
addressed the effect of issue preclusion on Herrera’s claim.29 Because the 
circuit court had affirmed on the basis of issue preclusion, relying on 
Repsis’s previous determination of the Tribe’s reserved rights under the 
Treaty, the Court’s destruction of the underlying reasoning of Repsis 
allowed it to reverse on this basis as well.30 The Court relied on the 
exception to the issue preclusion doctrine that allows for successive 
litigation of an issue when there is “an intervening ‘change in [the] 
applicable legal context’” because the “changed circumstances may not 
‘advance the equitable administration of the law.’”31 The Court noted that 
the circumstances in this case deserved application of the exception 
because they were not “marginal.”32  
 Following the Court’s clarification of the law and assurance that 
the issue preclusion would not apply, it proceeded with its analysis 
regarding the abrogation of reserved treaty rights as set out in Mille Lacs. 
As it defined the rule in United States v. Dion, the Court noted that 
abrogation of treaty rights requires “clear evidence’” that Congress had 
such an intent based on its consideration and weighing of the abrogation 
against another action.33 The Court echoed its findings in Mille Lacs that 
there was no such intent evidenced in the Wyoming Statehood Act because 
it lacked any mention of Indian treaty rights—let alone any indication that 
this effect was considered.34 Based on the canons of construction for 
Indian treaties,35 the Court determined that the Treaty did not require 
expiration of reserved rights at statehood because there was no such 
circumstance defined in it, nor any indication that the circumstances 
 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. at 1695, 1697. 
27.  Id. at 1695. 
28.  Id. at 1695–96 (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207). 
 29.      Id. at 1697. 
 30.      Id. at 1698. 
31.  Id. at 1697 (internal citations omitted).  
32.  Id. at 1698 (stating that “[a]t a minimum, a repudiated decision does 
not retain preclusive force”). 
33.  Id.; United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986). 
34.  Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1698–99. 
 35.      The Court has applied a special rule for interpreting Indian treaties, 
often labeled as the canons of construction. This rule requires that treaties be 
interpreted based on the parties’ intentions at the time of the treaty, with all 
ambiguities resolved in the tribe’s favor. Id. at 1699. 
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defined under the Treaty “would necessarily be satisfied at statehood.”36 
The Court supported its analysis with references to the historical record, 
specifically treaty negotiations in which the Tribe discussed the high 
priority of including the reserved rights, and the absence of any discussion 
of those rights ending at statehood.37  
 Finally, the Court addressed Wyoming’s argument that the 
practical effect of statehood was to render all lands within it “occupied” 
due to the “arrival of ‘civilization’” into the territory and the 
“disappearance of the wild frontier.”38 Setting aside the accuracy of the 
region’s historical account, the Court found Wyoming’s argument cut 
directly against the rule of Mille Lacs.39 It emphasized that abrogation 
cannot be implicit or found as a practical effect, and that “by using 
statehood as a proxy for occupation,” Wyoming subverted the Court’s 
“clear instruction that treaty-protected rights ‘are not impliedly terminated 
upon statehood.’”40 
 
B.  Occupation of Big Horn National Forest 
 
 Finding the Tribe’s treaty rights unaffected by statehood, the 
Court turned to Wyoming’s arguments that the treaty rights could not be 
supported within the Bighorn National Forest because of its categorical 
occupation at the time of its creation, its occupation following the federal 
government’s regulation of it, or its occupation following the exploitative 
industries operating within it.41  
 Using the canons of construction as a guidepost for determining 
the occupancy status of the Bighorn National Forest, the Court stated that 
“unoccupied” could only have been interpreted by the Tribe “to denote an 
area free of residence or settlement” by non-Indians.42 This was because 
of the Treaty’s juxtaposition of the terms “occupation” and “settlers” in 
several instances, in addition to this juxtaposition in the treaty negotiations 
and in subsequent interpretations by the government.43 Relying on this 
reasoning, the Court held that the Bighorn National Forest’s creation did 
not render it “occupied,” but rather “‘reserved’ the lands from . . . 
settlement[,]” thus making it “more hospitable, not less, to the Tribe’s 
exercise of the 1868 Treaty right.”44  
 The Court concluded its opinion by rejecting Wyoming’s final 
arguments that either the federal regulatory scheme imposed within the 
 
36.  Id. at 1699 (citing Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207); see also 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 
U.S. 658, 675 (1979). 
37.  Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699. 
38. Id. at 1699–1700. 
39.     Id.  
40. Id. 
41.  Id. at 1700–01. 
 42.      Id. at 1701. 
43.  Id. at 1701–02. 
44.  Id. at 1702. 
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Bighorn National Forest or the exploitative mining and logging operations 
within it should have rendered it occupied within the meaning of the 
Treaty.45 Relying again on the canons, the Court noted that the phrase 
“unoccupied lands” would have meant lack of settlement to the Tribe.46 
Thus, as neither the government’s regulations nor the mining and logging 
operations would have satisfied this understanding, neither circumstance 
could render the lands occupied.47 
 
IV.  DISSENT 
 
 The dissent solely addressed the issue preclusion argument.48 
Despite the Court’s application of this exception to Repsis, the dissent 
argued that Repsis should still apply and that, in effect, the majority’s 
analysis of the treaty-interpretation issue “is likely, in the end, to be so 
much wasted ink.”49 The dissent cautioned future application of the issue 
preclusion exception, noting that the Court has “never actually held that a 
prior judgment lacked preclusive effect on [the ground of issue 
preclusion]” and that “[i]f the exception is applied too aggressively, it 
could dangerously undermine the important interests served by issue 
preclusion.”50 Based on this cautious approach, the dissent’s opinion that 
it would be a “questionable interpretation” to find Mille Lacs overruled 
Race Horse, and Repsis’s alternative ground that the Bighorn National 
Forest was already occupied, the dissent would have affirmed on the 
ground of issue preclusion and not proceeded on the treaty-interpretation 
issue.51 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Herrera clarified the effect of statehood on reserved treaty rights 
by repudiating Race Horse and by adopting the reasoning underlying Mille 
Lacs. The Court found that statehood does not automatically render the 
expiration of treaty rights and that, instead, abrogation requires clear 
evidence of such intent from Congress.52 This holding clarified the impact 
of Race Horse, which has been a source of difficulty in the field of Indian 
law.53 Further, the Court relied upon the canons to find that the Bighorn 
National Forest had not become categorically occupied within the 
meaning of the Treaty.54 Thus, the Court found Herrera’s hunting rights 
 
 45.      Id. at 1702. 
46.  Id. at 1702–03. 
 47.      Id.  
 48.      Id. at 1703 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
49.  Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
50.  Id. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
51.  Id. at 1708, 1710. 
52.  Id. at 1700. 
 53.      Id. at 1695, 1697. 
54. Id. at 1702–03. 
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under the Treaty to be valid.55 However, the Court specifically limited its 
holding to allow the possibility of two arguments on remand: (1) that some 
areas of the forest, including the site where Herrera took the elk, may 
indeed be occupied by specific circumstances—as opposed to categorical 
occupation; and (2) that Wyoming may have the ability to regulate the 
Tribe’s treaty rights for conservation purposes.56 
 
 55.      Id. at 1700, 1703. 
56.  Id. at 1703. 
